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Abstract14
From what to wear to a friend’s party, to whether to stay in academia or pursue a career15
in industry, nearly all of our decisions are accompanied by a degree of confidence that16
provides an assessment of the expected outcome. Although significant progress has been17
made in understanding the computations underlying confidence judgment, the preponder-18
ance of studies focuses on perceptual decisions, in which individuals sequentially sample19
noisy information and accumulate it as evidence until a threshold is exceeded. Once a20
decision is made, they initiate an action to implement the choice. However, we often21
have to make decisions during ongoing actions in dynamic environments where the value22
and the availability of the alternative options can change with time and previous actions.23
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2The current study aims to decipher the computations underlying confidence judgment in24
action decisions that are made in a dynamic environment. Using a reaching task in which25
movements are initiated to multiple potential targets, we show that action selection, reac-26
tion time and choice confidence all emerge from a common computation in which parallel27
prepared actions compete based on the overall desirability of targets and action plans.28
1 Introduction29
On January 15, 2009, the US Airways flight 1549, a domestic flight from La Guardia30
Aiport in New York City to Seattle/Tacoma, experienced a complete loss of thrust in31
both engines after encountering a flock of Canada geese. As the aircraft lost altitude, the32
air traffic control asked the pilot if he could either return to La Guardia or to land at33
the nearby Teterboro airport. Having less than 5 minutes after the bird strike to land34
the plane, the pilot rejected both options, because he was not confident that he could35
make any runway. Instead, he safely glided the plane to ditch in the Hudson river. Later36
investigation showed that the low altitude and the lack of power on both engines would37
not allow for a successful landing to either airport. This incident describes a ubiquitous38
situation in which choice confidence - i.e., the subjective belief that a given action is39
more desirable than any alternative - has a key role in guiding behavior, especially in40
dynamic decisions that are made under pressure and while acting. Although confidence is41
an essential component in human behavior, only recently have we begun to decipher the42
computations underlying confidence. However, most of this understanding has been built43
on a fairly restrictive experimental paradigm involving simple decisions like perceptual44
judgments [1–5] and value-based decisions [6] in stable environments where actions occur45
only after a choice is made.46
All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/180281doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Aug. 24, 2017; 
3While many of our decisions are solely based on incoming sensory information, we47
must often select between competing options by integrating information from disparate48
sources (e.g., altitude of the plane, thrust of the engines, airplane condition, etc) while49
acting. In the current study, we aim to elucidate the computations underlying choice50
confidence, modeling confidence as a belief that an action has an overall better set of51
outcomes (costs and benefits) than alternatives. We designed a “reach-before-you-know”52
experiment that involved rapid reaches to two potential targets presented simultaneously53
in both hemifields [7, 8]. Critically, the actual goal location was not disclosed before the54
movement onset. Dual-target trials were interleaved with single-target trials in which one55
target was presented either in the left or the right hemifield. By varying the target prob-56
ability to induce different levels of uncertainty, we tested how goal location uncertainty57
influences behavior. We found that when both targets had about the same probability58
of action, individuals delayed making a decision and moved towards an intermediary lo-59
cation, waiting to collect more information before selecting one of the targets - a spatial60
averaging strategy reported in previous studies [7,9,10]. On the contrary, when one of the61
targets had higher probability of action, reaches had faster responses and launched closer62
to the likely target. These findings suggest that target certainty influences both planning63
and execution of actions in decisions with multiple competing options. Surprisingly, the64
relationship between approach direction with reaction time was not fully mediated by65
the target probability. Instead, when people waited longer to initiate an action, reaches66
were frequently launched towards an intermediary location between the potential goals,67
regardless of the target probability.68
To better understand the relationships between confidence, reaction time and tra-69
jectories, we modeled the decision task within a recently proposed computational the-70
ory [11,12]. The theory builds on the affordance competition hypothesis, in which multiple71
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4actions are formed concurrently and compete over time until one has a sufficient evidence72
to win the competition [13, 14]. We replace evidence with desirability - a continuously73
accumulated quantity that integrates all sources of information about the relative value74
of an action with respect to alternatives. Reaching movements are generated as a mixture75
of actions weighted by their relative desirability values. In analogy with the normative76
evidence accumulation models [4,15,16], we determine choice confidence through the de-77
sirability values. Ambiguous desirabilities indicate that the net evidence supporting one78
option over the others is weak and therefore the confidence level about the current best79
action is low. On the contrary, when one action outperforms the alternatives, the net evi-80
dence is strong and choice confidence in high. Therefore, the “winning” action determines81
the selected target and the reaction time, whereas the “losing” action contributes to the82
computation of confidence - i.e., the closer the desirability of the non-selected action to83
the desirability of the selected one, the lower the choice confidence. Because desirability84
is time- and state- dependent, and action competition often does not end after move-85
ment onset, selected actions can be changed or corrected in-flight (i.e., change of mind)86
when confidence is sufficiently low, and/or in the presence of new incoming information.87
Hence, the model predicts that both movement direction and reaction time can be used88
as an easy-to-measure proxies for choice confidence. When people are uncertain about89
the current best option, decisions are delayed by both moving towards an intermediary90
location and by having longer reaction time. In contrast, when they are certain, reaches91
are initiated faster and move directly to a target. Importantly, the model predicts that92
the association between approach direction and reaction time is not fully mediated by the93
target certainty. Instead, action competition can diminish choice confidence leading to94
slower responses regardless of target probability. Overall, model predictions are consistent95
with human findings providing direct evidence that action selection, reaction time and96
All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/180281doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Aug. 24, 2017; 
5choice confidence emerge through a common mechanism of desirability-driven competition97
between parallel prepared actions.98
2 Results99
2.1 Behavioral paradigm100
A schematic representation of the experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. Participants were101
instructed to perform rapid reaches using a robotic manipulandum under a “reach-before-102
you-know” paradigm [7, 8] in which either one (single-target trials) or two (dual-target103
trials) potential targets presented simultaneously in opposite hemifields. For dual-target104
trials, the cues appeared symmetric around the vertical axis of the screen. By varying105
the number of potential targets and their probabilities, we induce different level of uncer-106
tainty to study the computations underlying choice confidence in action decisions. Each107
participant ran two separate sessions. In the equiprobable session, a trial started with108
participants fixating on a central cross, followed by the presentation of one or two unfilled109
blue circles in the screen Fig. 2A. When the fixation cue was extinguished, an auditory110
cue signaled the individuals to initiate their responses. Once the reaching movement ex-111
ceeded a threshold, one of the targets filled-in black indicating the actual goal location.112
The unequiprobable session was similar to equiprobable except for the dual-target tri-113
als, in which one of the potential targets was always assigned with higher probability (0.8)114
than alternative one (0.2). The targets with the high and low probabilities were indicated115
by unfilled green and red cues, respectively. In single-target trials (i.e., target probability116
1) which were randomly interleaved with the dual-target trials in both sessions, a single117
unfilled blue cue was presented in the left or the right hemifield. The set of target con-118
figurations is shown in Fig. 2B. Participants achieved an overall success rate around 93%119
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6and their performance was similar between the two sessions (93% and 90% respectively).120
121
FIGURE 1 somewhere here122
123
124
FIGURE 2 somewhere here125
126
2.2 Initial approach direction varies with target probability127
Goal location uncertainty is well known to have a strong effect on reach trajectories, where128
the initial movement trajectory is aimed between targets. This motor behavior, which has129
been extensively reported before [7,9,10,17], indicates that the approach direction of the130
initial reaches varies with the target probability, a finding we replicated. Average reach131
trajectories from a representative participant are illustrated in Figs. 3A and B, when the132
actual goal was located in the left and the right hemifield, respectively. When there was133
no uncertainty, reaches were made directly to the goal target (black traces). However,134
when the goal location was unknown at movement onset, but both targets had the same135
probability, reaches were aimed to an intermediary position between the potential goal136
locations (blue traces). These spatially averaged movements were reliably biased towards137
the side of space with the most likely target (green traces). We measured the approach138
direction across participants, number of targets and probabilities and found that it is139
directly correlated with the target certainty (best fit linear regression model; R-square =140
0.971, p-value = 0.00212 of the linear coefficient) Fig. 4A. However, we also found that141
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7uncertainty has a big impact on reach initiation. When people are uncertain about the142
current best action, they both delayed their decision and moved towards an intermediary143
location between the targets, a strategy consistent with increasing chances of collecting144
more information before making a choice.145
146
FIGURE 3 somewhere here147
148
2.3 Reaction time varies with the target probability149
The dual effects of goal uncertainty on reach trajectory and reach initiation timing sug-150
gest target certainty is incorporated into both acting (trajectory generation) and planning151
processes. Intuitively, it is reasonable that target probability influences action planning152
to delay initiating action when uncertain about the best option. This predicts reaction153
times (RT) would be a direct function of target probability. On average, this prediction154
is validated as illustrated in Fig. 4B for single-target trials, two-target trials with equal155
probability and two-target trials with unequal probability, with RT averaged across par-156
ticipants. While RT is significantly correlated with the target certainty (best fit quadratic157
regression model; R-square = 0.994, p-value = 0.002 of the quadratic coefficient), a trial-158
by-trial analysis showed that the effect on initiation timing was indirect and actually159
mediated by a latent variable influencing both RT and the approach direction of a tra-160
jectory.161
By plotting RT vs. approach direction separately for the two sessions, we found that162
changes in RT are independent of target probability and accounted for by approach di-163
rection. Fig. 4C shows RT as a function of the initial approach direction across all164
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8participants and trials separately for the two sessions. Importantly, RT increases with165
reaches to intermediary location between the potential goal locations and peaks around166
20◦ (possibly due to the biomechanical constraints of the reaching movements) regardless167
of the target probability (best fit cubic regression model; R-square < 0.95, p-value < 0.01168
for the cubic coefficient in both sessions). To ensure that this effect was not due to some169
inherent constraints induced by the experimental setup - i.e., reaches launched to targets170
located at the center of the screen have longer RTs than reaches aimed to peripheral171
targets - we varied the target separation between 0.10 m to 0.20 m (which corresponds172
to a visual angle between 26.5 and 45 degrees) in the equiprobable session and computed173
the RT in the single-target trials. No significant association was found between target174
location and RT (linear regression model: R-square = 0.476, p-value = 0.197 of the linear175
coefficient), Fig. 4D. Instead, both approach direction and reaction time are driven by176
trial-by-trial variations in a latent variable, which we identify with decision confidence as177
we describe in the following sections. Note that in this analysis we used 3 individuals,178
who were not part of the main experiment and did not go through the training session179
before running the task. This could explain why RTs were slightly longer compared to180
single-target trials in the two main sessions.181
182
FIGURE 4 somewhere here183
184
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92.4 Action selection, reaction time and choice confidence emerge185
through action competition186
Our results require a decision computation that would produce joint changes in trajectory187
and RT as a function of trial-by-trial fluctuations in decision confidence. A recently188
developed theory [11, 12] predicts exactly these effects. In the theory, action decisions189
are made through a continuous competition of parallel prepared actions by dynamically190
integrated all sources of information about the quality of the alternative options. The191
neurodynamic implementation of this theory for a dual-target trial is presented in Fig. 5.192
The framework consists of a set of dynamic neural fields (DNFs), which mimic the neural193
processes underlying spatial sensory input, expected outcome, reach cost (i.e., effort) and194
reach planning [11]. Each DNF simulates the dynamic evolution of firing rate activity195
within a neuronal population. The functional properties of each DNF are determined by196
the lateral interactions within the field and the connections with other fields [18,19].197
198
FIGURE 5 somewhere here199
200
The “reach planning” field employs a neuronal population code over 181 potential201
movement directions to plan motor actions towards these directions. It receives one-to-202
one excitatory inputs from the “spatial sensory input” field that encodes the angular203
representation of the targets and the “expected outcome” field that represents the ex-204
pected outcome of aiming to a particular direction. It also receives one-to-one inhibitory205
inputs from the “reach cost” field that encodes the effort required to move to a particular206
direction. Each neuron in the reach planning field is projected to a stochastic optimal207
control system. Once the activity of a reach neuron i exceeds a threshold γ at the current208
All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/180281doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Aug. 24, 2017; 
10
state xt, the corresponding controller initiates an optimal sequence of actions (i.e., policy,209
pi∗) to move the “hand” towards the preferred direction of that neuron (see materials210
and methods section for more details). The normalized activity of the reach planning211
field represents the desirability of the motor actions, and acts as a weighting factor on212
them. It reflects how “desirable” it is to move to a particular direction with respect to213
the alternatives. Because desirability is time- and state- dependent, the weighted mixture214
of individual actions automatically produces a range of behavior, from direct reaching215
movement to weighted averaging.216
Fig. 6A illustrates the activity of the planning field as a function of time for a rep-217
resentative dual-target trial with equiprobable targets. Initially, the field activity is in218
the resting state. After targets onset, two neuronal populations selective for the targets219
are formed and compete through mutual inhibitory interactions, while integrating infor-220
mation about the target certainty and action cost to bias the competition. Once the221
activity of one them exceeds a response threshold, the corresponding target is selected222
and a reaching movement is initiated. Frequently, the neuronal activity of the unselected223
target is not suppressed before movement onset, resulting in reaches towards intermediary224
locations between the targets (top inset in Fig. 6A). After the movement onset, the two225
neuronal ensembles retain activity and compete against each other until the goal onset.226
To get better insight on the model computations consider two neurons, one from each227
population, centered at the target locations. Fig. 6B depicts the activity of each neuron228
(i.e., which reflects its current desirability value) as function of time for a dual-target trial229
with equal (blue traces) and unequal (green traces) target probability. The neuron that230
exceeds the response threshold first (continuous traces) dictates the reaction time and the231
selected target. Intuitively, if the race between the neurons is a close call (blue traces), it232
means that the net evidence supporting that the selected target is more desirable than the233
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alternative is weak and therefore individuals should be less confident about their choices.234
On the other hand, if the race was a landslide (green traces), it means that one alternative235
outperforms the other and therefore individuals should be more confident about their236
choice. Going back to the population analysis, the “winning” population determines237
the reaction time and the selected target, whereas the “losing” one contributes to the238
computation of the confidence that the selected option is the best current alternative.239
Note that in the absence of action competition (i.e., single-target trials), the activity240
of the neuron exceeds the response threshold faster than when two actions compete for241
selection (black trace). Hence, reaches have shorter RTs and aim directly to the goal242
location. Overall, the theory is analogous to the normative race models in perceptual243
decisions in which two accumulators integrate sensory evidence in favor of two alternative244
options [4,20]. The accumulator that reaches its upper bound faster dictates the reaction245
time and the choice, whereas the losing accumulator contributes to the computation of246
certainty that the choice is correct.247
248
FIGURE 6 somewhere here249
250
We simulated the two equiproble and unequiprobable sessions within the computa-251
tional theory, having the same fixed parameter values used to model a different reaching252
dataset [11]. Consistent with the human behavior, we found that target probability is253
correlated with the approach direction Fig. 7A (best fit linear regression model: R-square254
= 0.984, p-value = 0.0005 of the linear coefficient) and the RT Fig. 7B (best fit quadratic255
regression model: R-square = 0.984, p-value 0.008 of the quadratic coefficient). We also256
tested trial-by-trial association between RT and approach direction and found the same257
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independence from target probability, Fig. 7C (best fit cubic regression model: R-square258
< 0.970, p-value < 0.007 for the cubic coefficient in both sessions). In particular, simu-259
lated reaches aimed towards an intermediary location between the potential targets had260
longer RT than reaches launched closer to one of the competing options regardless of the261
target probability. This is explained by the inhibitory competition between the neuronal262
ensembles that slows down the reach onset and leads to spatial averaging movements, if263
the population of the unselected action is not completely suppressed at the movement264
initiation. Considering that the difference between the desirability values determines the265
confidence of the selected action suggests that approach direction and RT are not fully266
coupled but there is a third variable (i.e., confidence level) that influences the association267
between them. That is, the longer that you wait to make an action, the less confident268
you are feeling about the selected action, because often the unselected one is not fully269
rejected. Overall, our findings provide direct evidence that action selection, reaction time270
and confidence that the selected action is better than the alternatives emerge through a271
common mechanism of desirability-driven competition between parallel prepared actions.272
273




Uncertainty is ubiquitous in our interactions with the external world, and decisions reg-278
ularly must be made in the face of it. Even after a decision is made, there is residual279
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uncertainty that persists in the form of subjective choice certainty, reflecting the strength280
of our belief that an option is better in the sense it is more likely correct or has a higher281
expected outcome than it’s alternatives. Although monitoring subjective choice certainty282
is crucial in guiding adaptive behavior, especially in complex and dynamic environments,283
decision neuroscience has focused on the primary problem of predicting decisions, largely284
ignoring the meta-cognitive role of monitoring decision quality. This was partly due to285
lack of reliable measurements to estimate confidence, especially in nonverbal animals, and286
also due to a paucity of theoretical proposals for how confidence emerges in decisions.287
Recent efforts have been made to fill both these gaps. Perceptual decision stud-288
ies in humans have simultaneously measured choices and confidence levels [4, 21], while289
a postdecision wager method has been introduced to measure confidence in nonverbal290
animals [2, 3, 22]. In addition, normative models, which include drift diffusion, evidence-291
accumulation, and race models [23–28], have been extended to understand how confidence292
emerges in perceptual decisions [4, 21]. Although parsimonious, these studies are highly293
restricted and limited to binary perceptual choices made solely on the basis of the accu-294
mulation of sensory evidence in static and fixed environments. In these models, confidence295
is construed as reflecting the effective amount of sensory evidence at decision time, which296
is not adequate to account for the subjective choice certainty in complex decisions. More297
commonly, decisions are made in dynamic and complex environments, in which the value298
and the availability of the options change with time and previous actions, entangling de-299
cision with action selection. Subjective confidence should reflect all the factors that affect300
our belief that we have made the best choice, and we need to enlarge our conception of301
confidence to include these factors.302
In the current study, we adopted this enriched view to explore how confidence emerges303
in decisions requiring reaching to targets with uncertainty. Confidence was modeled as304
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reflecting the degree of subjective belief that a potential action is more desirable than305
its alternatives. We designed a “reach-before-you-know” experiment in which individuals306
were instructed to perform rapid reaches to one or two potential targets presented simul-307
taneously in both hemifields. To elucidate the computations underlying confidence, we308
modeled the task within a recently developed computational theory [11,12]. It is based on309
the idea that decisions are made through a continuous competition between neuronal pop-310
ulations that plan individual actions to the available goals, while dynamically integrating311
information into a common currency - named relative desirability - to bias the competition.312
The desirability reflects the belief about the quality of the action and acts as weighted313
factor on each individual action. The neuronal population that exceeds first a response314
threshold dictates the reaction time and the selected target. The competing population315
that did not exceed the threshold contributes to the computation of the confidence; the316
closer the “losing” population to the threshold the lower the confidence about the selected317
option. When the activity of the losing population is not completed suppressed, reaches318
are aimed towards an intermediary location between the targets. Therefore, the approach319
direction is an easy-to-measure proxy for choice confidence. The model predicts a direct320
association between target certainty with approach direction of the initial reaches and321
reaction time. When both targets are equally probable, the competition between the two322
populations is frequently a close call, which means that the net evidence supporting the323
selected action is weak and we should be less confident about the current best action.324
This results in slower reaction times and spatially averaged movements to an interme-325
diary location between the potential goals. On the contrary, when one of the targets is326
assigned with higher probability, the competition is biased to the likely target. In this327
case the net evidence supporting the selected action is strong and therefore we should328
be more confidence about the current best action. This results in faster reaction times329
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and more direct reaches to the selected target. Importantly, the model suggests that the330
association between reaction time and approach direction is not fully mediated by the331
target certainty. Instead, the longer it takes to initiate an action, the more likely it is332
that the losing population will still be active at the movement onset, resulting in lower333
confidence level about the selected option and spatially averaged movements. Hence, re-334
action time and approach direction are not fully mediated by the target probability, but335
they are influenced by the confidence about the current best option. Overall, we provide336
direct evidence for the first time that action selection, reaction time and choice confidence337
emerge through a continuous competition between parallel prepared actions.338
Consistent with the model predictions, individuals adopted a spatial averaging be-339
havior to compensate for the goal location uncertainty. Although this behavior has been340
reported before [7–9], the pattern of compensation is better described as buying more341
time for decisions. When people are uncertain about the current best option, they delay342
the decision both by moving towards an intermediary location between the targets and by343
having a longer reaction time. In contrast, when certain they initiate movement quickly344
and aim directly to the selected target. In line with the model predictions, trial by trial345
reaction time was correlated with the approach direction regardless of the target proba-346
bility. Longer reaction times are often associated with weak accumulated evidence about347
the current best option (i.e., strong competition between the desirabilities of the actions).348
This might suggest that the brain learns to use decision time as a proxy for confidence349
judgment (see also [4, 5, 29])350
3.2 From sensory evidence to desirability competition351
Although our theory employs an “accumulator” mechanism, it is quite different from the352
race models. It does not assign a priori populations of neurons to alternative options;353
All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission. 
(which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.
The copyright holder for this preprint. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/180281doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Aug. 24, 2017; 
16
rather the alternative options emerge within a distributed neuronal population by inte-354
grating information from multiple sources. Consequently, it can handle not only binary355
decisions, but also decisions between multiple competing goals. It accumulates and inte-356
grates information from more than one source (e.g., sensory evidence, expected outcome,357
action cost, etc). Importantly, it is not limited by the serial order assumption that action358
planning begins only after a decisions is made. Instead, the competing options are con-359
tinuously evaluated after the movement onset, whereas a decision can be changed while360
acting in the presence of new information. The main difference between our theory and361
the normative race models is that the “accumulators” compete based on the relative de-362
sirability, instead of the sensory evidence of the alternative options. Desirability provides363
a more general measurement to evaluate an alternative, since it includes information not364
only about the goal itself, but also the action required to achieve that goal. Our theory365
is inline with a series of neurophysiological and pharmacological intervention studies in366
animals reporting that areas in the posterior parietal cortex integrate value information367
to estimate the relative desirability of available options [30–34]. On the contrary, al-368
though neurons in specific PPC regions exhibit activity patterns that directly resemble369
the evidence accumulation process posited in race models [35,36], recent studies reported370
that silencing these neurons does not influence the decision process [37, 38]. These find-371
ings question the role of PPC in perceptual decisions and prompt more scrutiny of the372
evidence-accumulation models [39].373
3.3 Parallel versus serial hypothesis for action selection374
The key point of our theory is that the brain plans multiple actions in parallel that compete375
for selection, and this competition continues into execution. Although a growing body of376
experimental studies provide evidence in favor of parallel planning of competing actions377
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[7,8,13,40–45], other studies argued against this hypothesis suggesting that decision and378
action are separate processes - i.e., planning and execution of action occur after a decision379
is made [46–51]. According to this theory, the spatial averaging behavior observed in dual-380
target trials does not necessarily reflect “motor averaging” - i.e., simultaneous planning381
of multiple competing single-target actions - but it could be equivalently interpreted as382
evidence of “visual averaging” across the locations of the targets - i.e., planning and383
execution of a single action towards a weighted averaged target location [43, 44]. The384
visual averaging hypothesis could explain the spatial averaging behavior and some aspects385
of action selection and reach timing. For instance, it could be argued that reaction time386
is shorter in the unequiprobable trials because individuals aim more often directly to387
the likely target, instead of estimating first and then moving to the weighted average388
location between the targets. However, the visual averaging hypothesis is insufficient to389
explain how choice confidence is diminished with reaction time regardless of the target390
probability. This effect can be modeled only within two modules that accumulate and391
integrate sources of information in favor of the two options and compete for selection (see392
an analogous case for perceptual decisions in [4]).393
The action competition hypothesis is also in apparent conflict with a recent study394
arguing that planning and initiation of an action are mechanistically independent [52].395
According to this study, reaction time does not reflect the time at which the competi-396
tion between the parallel planned actions is resolved - i.e., there is no causal relationship397
between planning and initiation of actions. Instead, reaction time is determined by an in-398
dependent initiation process. It is likely that action initiation occurs at a fixed delay after399
the action planning. However, this study did not account for goal location uncertainty400
or multiple competing goals. Instead, the individuals had to perform center-out reaches401
to one of eight peripheral targets arranged in a circle, and therefore they did not need to402
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generate multiple actions that compete for selection. Overall, our findings provide further403
evidence in favor of the affordance competition hypothesis suggesting that the process404
of deliberating between different actions emerges via a continuous competition between405
these actions.406
4 Materials and Methods407
4.1 Participants408
Seven right-handed (20-30 years old, 4 men and 3 women) individuals with normal or409
corrected-to-normal vision participated in this experiment study. The appropriate insti-410
tutional review board approved the study protocol and informed consent was obtained411
based on the Declaration of Helsinki.412
4.2 Experimental setup413
A rough sketch of the experimental setup used in this study is shown Fig. 1. Participants414
were seated facing a Phantom Premium 1.5 Haptic Robot (Sensable Technologies, MA)415
and a computer display, aligned so that the midline of their body was in line with the center416
of screen and robot. The workspace of the phantom haptic robot forms a hemisphere417
approximately 30 cm in radius. The participants selected a comfortable position and418
inserted the right index finger into the endpoint of the tip of the robotic manipulandum.419
The distance dsubject from the head of the participants to the finger starting position420
measured along the y axis was about 0.30 m. This distance was slightly varied between421
participants, since we did not use a chin rest or any other restraining device. Hence,422
there was some movement of the head relative to the screen, but was minimal since423
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the participants were instructed to remain stationary throughout the experiment. The424
distance from the finger starting position to the screen display ddisplay was about 0.35 m425
and was calibrated at the beginning of each session.426
The participants were trained to perform rapid reaching movements using the robotic427
manipulandum. The reaching movements were performed in the horizontal plane and428
translated into movements of a small cursor circle (1.5 cm diameter) in the vertical plane429
of the computer screen - i.e., reaches towards the screen moved the cursor to the top of the430
screen, while left and right mapping was preserved. This experimental set up allowed for431
high temporal and spatial resolution of the hand and finger position as well as a mean to432
create haptic feedback or altered movement dynamics for future experiments. Control of433
the phantom robot and the experiment were implemented using the OpenHaptics drivers434
provided by Sensable technologies, and the Simulation Laboratory (SL) and Real-Time435
Control Software Package [53] as well as other custom psychophysics software. Control436
and recording of the phantom state were performed at 500 Hz.437
4.3 Experimental paradigm438
At the start of each trial participants were required to move the cursor to the starting439
position, located at the origin of our coordinate system, Fig. 2. A fixation cross was then440
presented at the center of the screen and the participants were instructed to fixate for a441
short period of time (t¯ = 1500 ms, σt = 300 ms). During the final 300 ms of fixation,442
either a single cue was presented on the upper-left or upper-right of the screen or two443
cues were presented simultaneously in both sides of space. Cues were presented as unfilled444
circles with 3 cm in radius on a white background. After the fixation offset (go-signal)445
the participants had to initiate a rapid reaching movement. Once the cursor exceeded446
a certain trigger threshold (i.e., a virtual wall in the x − z plane; red discontinuous line447
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in Fig. 2), the single cue or one of the two cues was filled-in black indicating the actual448
location of the goal. If the participants brought the cursor to the cued target within 1.0449
s the trial was considered successful. Trials in which the participants responded before450
the go-signal or arrived to the cued target after the allowed movement time were aborted451
and were not used for further analysis. The distance between the origin and the midpoint452
of the two targets was dreach = 0.20 m. The target separation distance - i.e., distance453
between the target and the midpoint - was dseparation = 0.15 m. The trigger threshold454
distance - i.e., distance of the virtual wall from the origin - was dthreshold = 0.05 m.455
Individuals were familiarized with the task by running a set of training trials that456
included reaches to single and two targets. Once they felt ready and comfortable with the457
experimental setup, the actual experiment started. Each participant performed 3 reaching458
sessions (one training and two tests). The training session involved 40 trials, which were459
excluded from the analysis, followed by two test sessions with 80 trials each (2×80 = 160460
trials). The first test session involved reaches to one (40% of the trials) and two (60% of461
the trials) targets. In the single-target trials, the cue was shaded blue and was presented462
equiprobably to the left or right visual field (top row in Fig. 2). In the two-target trials,463
the cues were also shaded blue and had equal probability of filling-in after the movement464
onset (bottom row in Fig. 2). The second test session was similar to the first one with465
the only difference that one of the cues was always assigned with higher probability in the466
two-target trials. The “likely” cue was shaded green and had 80% probability of being the467
correct target, while the alternative cue was shaded red and had 20% probability. The set468
of target configurations is illustrated in Fig. 2B. Individuals were not informed what the469
coloration indicates and learned the association during the experiment. Each participant470
performed the experiment twice with a minimum interval of 24 hours.471
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4.4 Behavioral data analysis472
Cubic interpolating splines were used to smooth the reach trajectories and compute the473
velocity of the movements. The initial approach direction was measured from the direction474
of the main axis of the covariance ellipse that describes the spatial variation of the cursor475
from the movement initiation to the goal onset. Reaction time was defined as the time at476
which the reach velocity exceeded 5% of the maximum velocity.477
4.5 Neurodynamical framework478
In the current section, we briefly describe the architecture of the computational framework479
used to model the reaching experiment. Readers can refer to [11,12] for more details. The480
framework combines dynamic neural field (DNF) theory with stochastic optimal control481
(SOC) theory and includes circuitry for perception, expected outcome, selection bias,482
effort cost and decision making. Each DNF simulates the dynamic evolution of firing rate483
activity of a network of 181 neurons over a continuous space with local excitation and484
surround inhibition. The functional properties of each DNF are determined by the lateral485
inhibitions within the field and the connections with other fields in the architecture. The486
projections between the fields are topologically organized - i.e., each neuron i in a field487
drives the activation at the corresponding neuron i in the other field. The activity of a488
DNF evolves over time under the influence of external inputs, local excitation and lateral489
inhibition interactions as described by Eq. (1)490
τ u˙ (χ, t) = −u (χ, t) + h+ S (χ, t) +
∫
w (χ− χ′) f [u (χ′, t)] dχ′ (1)
where u (χ, t) is the local activity of the DNF at the position χ and time t, and u˙ (χ, t)491
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is the rate of change of the activity over time scaled by a time constant τ . If there is492
no external input S(χ, t), the field converges over time to the resting state H from the493
current level of activation. The interactions between the simulated neurons in the DNF494
are given via the kernel function w (χ− χ′), which consists of both local excitatory and495
inhibitory components, Eq. (2).496






where cexc, cinh, σexc, σinh describe the amplitude and the width of the excitatory and497
the inhibitory components, respectively.498
We convolved the kernel function with a sigmoidal transformation of the field so that499





The architectural organization of the framework is shown in Fig. 5. The “spatial501
sensory input” field encodes the angular representation of the competing goals in an ego-502
centric reference framework. The expected outcome for reaching to a particular direction503
centered on the hand position is encoded by the “expected outcome” field (see [11] for504
more details). In trials with equiprobable targets, the neuronal activity of the populations505
selective for these targets is about the same (blue Guassian distributions). However, in506
trials in which one of the targets is more likely than the alternative, the activity of the507
neuronal population selective for the “green” cue is higher than the activity of the popu-508
lations which is tuned to the “red” cue. The outputs of these two fields send excitatory509
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projections (green arrows) to the “reach planning” field in a topological manner. The510
“reach cost” field encodes the effort cost required to move to a particular direction at511
any given time and state. The output of this field sends inhibitory projections (orange512
arrow) to the reach planning field to penalize high-effort actions. The activity of the513
reach planning field at a given state xt is sum of the outputs of the fields encoding the514
location of the target uloc, the expected outcome uoutcome and the estimated reach cost515
ucost, corrupted by additive noise ξ which follows a Normal distribution.516
Saction(xt) = ηloculoc(xt) + ηoutcomeuoutcome(xt) − ηcostucost(xt) + ξ (4)
where ηloc, ηoutcome and ηcost scale the influence of the spatial sensory input field, the517
expected outcome field and the reach cost field, respectively, to the activity of action518
planning field. The values of the model parameters are given in the S1, S2 and S3 of519
the supporting information in [11]. The normalized activity of the action planning field520
describes the “relative desirability” of each policy pii - i.e., it reflects how “desirable” it is521
to move towards a particular direction φi with respect to the alternative options.522
Each neuron in the reach planning field is linked with a stochastic optimal controller.523
Once the activity of a neuron i exceeds a threshold γ, the controller i is triggered and524
generates an optimal policy pi∗i - i.e., sequence of actions towards the preferred direction525
of the neuron i - which is given by minimizing the following cost function:526




T R (xt) (5)
where the policy pii (xt) is a sequence of actions from t = 1 to t = Ti to move towards527
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the direction φi; Ti is the time required to arrive at the position pi; pi is the goal-position528
at the end of the movement and is given as pi = [r cos(φi), r sin(φi)], where r is the529
distance between the current location of the hand and the location of the cue which is530
tuned by the neuron i. Additionally, xTi is the state vector at the end of the movement,531
whereas the matrix S picks out the actual position of the hand and the goal-position pi at532
the end of the movement from the state vector. Finally, QTi and R define the precision-533
and the control- dependent cost, respectively. For more details about the optimal control534
model used in the framework see the supporting information in [11,12].535
The first term of Eq.(5) describes the current goal of the controller - i.e., move the536
hand at a distance r from the current location, towards the preferred direction φi of the537
neuron i. The second term describes the cost required for executing the policy pii (xt).538
Let’s now assume that M neurons are active at a given time t (i.e., the activity of M539
neurons is above the threshold γ). The framework computes and executes a weighted540








where νi(xt) is the normalized activity of the neuron i (i.e., the relative desirability543
value) at the state xt. Because the desirability is time- and state- dependent, the weighted544
mixture of the individual policies produces a range of behavior, from winner-take-all (i.e,545
direct reaching to a target) to spatial averaging.546
To handle contingencies, such as perturbations (e.g., changes on the number of targets,547
target probabilities, expected rewards, etc) and effects of noise, the framework implements548
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a widely used technique in stochastic optimal control known as “receding horizon” [54,55].549
In particular, the framework executes only the initial portion from the sequence of actions550
for a short period of time k (k = 10 in our study) and then recomputes the individual551
optimal policies pi∗i (xt+k) from time t+ k to t+ k + Ti and remixes them. This approach552
continues until the hand arrives to one of the targets.553
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Figure 1. A graphical representation of the experimental setup from two
perspectives. Participants (a) were seated directly in front of a Phantom haptic robot (c),
with their index finger inserted in a finger-tip adaptor (b) and their midline aligned with the
center of an LCD monitor (d). Reaching movements took place in the x− y plane, +y being
towards the screen and +x being towards the right hand side of the screen. The distance from
the head of the individuals to the finger starting position along the y axis was about
dsubject = 0.30 m and slightly varied across participants. The distance from the finger starting
position to the screen display was ddisplay = 0.35 m.
Figure 2. Task design and experimental paradigm. (A): A reaching trial started with a
fixation cross presented on the center of the screen for about 1.5 s. Then, either a single or two
unfilled cues were presented simultaneously in both visual fields. After 300 ms the central
fixation cross was extinguished (“go-signal”), and the participants had to perform a rapid
reaching movement towards the target(s) within 1 s. Once the reach trajectory crossed a
trigger threshold (red discontinuous line), one of the cues (or the single cue) was filled-in black
indicating the actual goal location. Responses before the go-signal or reaches that exceeded the
maximum movement time (1s) were aborted and not used for further analysis. (B): The color
of the cues in the dual-target trials indicated the target probabilities - blue cues corresponded
to equiprobable targets, wheres green and red cues corresponded to targets with 80% and 20%
probability, respectively. Single cues always had blue color. (C): The distance between the
origin and the midpoint of the two cues was dreach = 0.2 m. The distance between the cue and
the midpoint was dseparation = 0.15 m. The trigger threshold - i.e., distance between the origin
and the location that the actual goal location was revealed - was set to dthreshold = 0.05 m.
Figure 3. Average reach trajectories from a representative participant. (A): Reach
trajectories from single- (black trace) and two-target trials with equal (blue trace) and unequal
(green trace) probability, with actual goal located in the left hemifield. (B): Similar to A but
for actual goal located in the right hemifield. Target probability influences the reach
trajectories. When people were certain about the goal location, reaches were aimed directly to
the target. When they were uncertain, reaches were launched to an intermediary location and
then corrected in-flight to the cued target location. The spatially averaged behavior was biased
towards the likely target.
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Figure 4. Approach direction and reaction time. (A): Approach direction and (B)
reaction time across participants, number of targets and probabilities. (C): Reaction time as a
function of the approach direction in equiprobable (blue trace) and unequiprobable (green
trace) session (D): Reaction time as a function of target separation computed from
single-target trials across 3 participants. Error bars correspond to SE, solid lines show the
polynomial regression fitting (linear in panels A and D, quadratic and cubic in panels B and
C) and the colored shadow areas illustrate the confidence interval of the polynomial regression
results. Target probability influences both the approach direction and the reaction time of the
reaches. However, trial-by-trial analysis showed that reaction time and approach direction are
not fully mediated by the target probability. Instead, reaches with longer reaction times often
launch to an intermediate location between the potential goals.
Figure 5. Model architecture of the “reach-before-you-know” task. The neural fields
consist of 181 neurons and their spatial dimension spans the semi-circular space between 0◦
and 180◦. Each neuron in the reach planning field is connected with a stochastic optimal
control system. Once the activity of a neuron exceeds a threshold γ, the corresponding
controller generates a sequence of reach actions towards the preferred direction of the neuron.
The reach planning field receives excitatory inputs from the spatial sensory input field that
encodes the angular representation of the potential targets, and the expected outcome field
that encodes the expected outcome of the competing targets (blue, red and green Gaussian
distributions correspond to cues with 0.5, 0.2 and 0.8 target probability, respectively). It also
receives inhibitory inputs from the reach cost field that represents the effort required to move
towards a particular direction. The normalized activity of the reach planning field encodes the
“desirability” of the M available sequences of actions (i.e., neurons with activation level above
the threshold γ) at a given time and state and acts as a weighting factor on each individual
sequence of actions. Because the relative desirability is time- and state- dependent, a range of
behavior from weighted averaging (i.e., spatial averaging trajectories) to winner-take-all (i.e.,
direct reaches to one of the cues) is generated.
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Figure 6. Simulated neural activity and reach behavior. (A): A representative
example of the simulated model activity as a function of time in the reach planning field for a
dual-target trial with the actual goal located in the left visual field. The red discontinuous
lines indicate the target onset, the movement onset, and the goal onset. The corresponding
reach trajectory is shown in the upper inset. (B): Simulated activity of two planning neurons
centered at the location of the cued (continuous traces) and the uncued (discontinuous traces)
target, from a representative single-target trial (black trace) and two dual-target trials with
equal (blue traces) and unequal (green trace) probabilities. A reach movement is initiated
when the activity of one of the neurons exceeds the response threshold (gray discontinuous
trace). When only a single target is presented, the neuronal activity ramps up quickly to the
response threshold resulting in faster reactions and direct reaches to the target. However,
when two targets are simultaneously presented, the neurons compete for selection through
inhibitory interactions resulting often in slower reaction times and spatially averaged
movements. If one of the alternatives is assigned with higher probability, the competition is
biased to the likely target leading to faster responses.
Figure 7. Approach direction and reaction time of the simulated reaches. (A):
Approach direction and (B) reaction time of the simulated reaches across number of targets
and probabilities. (C): Reaction time as a function of the approach direction in the simulated
equiprobable (blue trace) and unequiprobable (green trace) sessions. Error bars correspond to
SE, solid lines show the polynomial regression fitting (linear in panel A, quadratic in panel B
and cubic in panel C) and the colored shadow areas illustrate the confidence interval of the
polynomial regression results. Consistent with the human findings, the model predicts that
target probability influences both the approach direction and the reaction time of the
movements. However, reaction time and approach direction are not fully mediated by the
target probability. Instead, the longer it takes to resolve the action competition, the more
likely it is the losing population to be still active at the movement onset, resulting in spatially
averaged reaches.
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